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PBG Leaks
This website documents an ongoing independent investigation of a multi-million dollar money-laundering scheme in Ukraine hidden from shareholders and law-enforcement agencies. Here you will see only part of the overall picture (crime). Independent journalists continue working in order to inform the public about additional facts. The enormity of the crimes committed will be exposed.

During the financial crisis and decline of real estate prices globally, the Polish company PBG, led by Jerzy Wiśniewski, took the bold step of entering Ukraine’s real estate market, expecting to reap the benefits in the fall of prices and assets, as well expecting a speedy recovery of prices and sales volumes.

PBG purchased a controlling stake in Energopol-Ukraine, which had worked in Kyiv’s construction market since 1991 and been engaged in a large project in the Ukrainian capital’s northern district — the Ministerial housing complex.

PBG promised to invest $240 million in the project, but wound up investing only $30 million.

2008

1.  In 2008, PGB S.A., under well-known Polish businessman Jerzy Wiśniewski announced it would enter Ukraine’s real estate market through the purchase of a 51% stake in Energopol-Ukraine.

 

2. PGB S.A. pledged to invest $240 million in construction projects in Ukraine. However, to date, it has invested only $30 million.

 

3. Of the $30 million invested, only about $10 million were used  construction. Some $20 million were withdrawn from the company by management controlled by PGB S.A., a fact that the company’s Ukrainian shareholder reported to police in 2019.

 

4. PBG S.A. made a good impression on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, investors and bankers with its statements about expanding its business in Ukraine.

 

5. A report by the Kyiv-based Delovaya Stolitsa ezine said 51% of Energopol-Ukraine, which then owned 63 hectares of land lots for construction projects in Kyiv, was purchased for about EUR 8.85 million.

 

See documents

1. PGB S.A. provides provides comprehensive, specialist contracting services for natural gas, crude oil, and fuel facilities. It acts as a general contractor, consortium member, or sub-contractor with respect to engineering design work, construction, repairs, operation, and maintenance.

 

Founding date: 1994

Listed on WSE: July 2, 2004

LEI Code: 259400X248CV8DJRIM55

 

PBG website

 

2. Energopol-Ukraine was founded in 1991 as an enterprise with 100% foreign capital. Its main activity is construction of various structures. During the last two decades, Energopol-Ukraine completed more than 20 industrial and residential construction projects, as well as the reconstruction of several historical buildings in Kyiv.

 

Energopol-Ukraine website

Energopol-Ukraine completed projects

 

3. Energopol-Ukraine share distribution from 22.03.2008:

CJSC «Makser» — 86%

Individual entity — 14%

 

Energopol-Ukraine share distribution after 22.03.2008:

CJSC «Makser» — 0%

Individual entity  — 86%

Oleksandr Klymenko — 14%

 

Energopol-Ukraine share distribution from 15.06.2009:

Individual entity — 35%

Wschodni Invest — 51%

Oleksandr Klymenko — 14%

 

 

2009

Jerzy Wiśniewski’s authorized representative Dariusz Szymański is responsible for controlling PBG S.A.’s investments in Ukraine. This did not prevent Energopol-Ukraine from concluding a strange contract, according to which it paid almost $10,6 million to Stroy Holding for work that it was incapable in principle of performing.

1. On August 17, 2009, Energopol-Ukraine and Stroy Holding conclude an agreement for the future of the development. The amount of the contract is around $10,6 million.

 

2. The contract appears odd, because:

 

— ‘Working documentation’ was contracted for before there was a project for construction (It is impossible to describe how to build an as yet unknown structure);

 

— At the time, Stroy Holding was not licensed and did not have the requisite permits to create ‘working documentation’ in accordance with Ukrainian legislation.

 

3. As a result, documentation prepared by Stroy Holding given to Energopol-Ukraine does not meet existing legal requirements and cannot be used during the construction process. The documentation, instead of a detailed plan, contains several draft plans drawn up by the Polish company Hydrobudowa Polska S.A.

 

4. Later, Energopol-Ukraine, in order to conduct the designated construction, concludes a contract for drafting ‘working documentation’ with another company, Stroitelno-Investitsionnaya Servisnaya Kompaniya (Construction and Investment Service Company), which during 2010-2018 competently completed similar works for about $3 million.

 

5. Energopol-Ukraine Director Tetiana Semenkova and Dariusz Szymański, representing the interests of Jerzy Wiśniewski, do not answer for the completed work, because no company shareholder meetings are held and no independent audit is conducted.

Energopol-Ukraine share distribution from 15.06.2009:

Dariusz Szymański — 35%

Wschodni Invest — 51%

Oleksandr Klymenko — 14%

 

Energopol-Ukraine share distribution from 23.11.2009:

Dariusz Szymański — 34%

Wschodni Invest — 51%

Oleksandr Klymenko — 14%

Dialog Plus — 1%

2010

In 2009-2010, Energopol-Ukraine signed a contract with the Polish company Cwertinia for conducting construction work in Poland. The Kyiv-based subcontractor did not have the permits, licenses, technical tools or employees to carry out the work. As a result, Energopol-Ukraine paid a $670,000 fine to the Polish company. The episode has all the hallmarks of an operation to deplete Energopol-Ukraine of capital by withdrawing funds to another country.

1. What is particularly striking is that Energopol-Ukraine’s management transferred the $670,000 fine to Cwertnia immediately, without attempting to rectify the situation or seeking a legal remedy in court.  This was not done, despite the fact there was enough time and opportunity to contest the agreement or decrease the fine amount.

 

2. Ukraine’s controlling agencies usually strictly prevent the practice of shadow asset withdrawals from companies under the guise of artificially created fines or penalties. In this case, however, the transfer was probably outside their purview, because a Polish investor held the majority stake in Energopol-Ukraine and the declared policy of Ukraine’s government was to protect foreign investors.

Distribution of Energopol-Ukraine shares from 30.06.2010:

Wschodni Invest — 51%

Dariusz Szymański — 18%

Oleksnadr Klymenko — 23%

Dialog Plus — 1%

2011

When apartments, starting with flats in the Kondratiuk St. 1 residential complex in Kyiv, went on sale in September 2011, Energopol-Ukraine had already spent all operation funds invested by the Polish side. The site was still under construction. Block work was being conducted on the 14th floor, and bricklaying on the 9th floor level. So where did the money go? The funds wound up in shadow companies, which did not conduct construction work but transferred funds through their accounts.

1. Construction work commissioned by Energopol-Ukraine for building the residential complex on Kondratiuk St. 1 in Kyiv was actually conducted by Stroitelno-investitsionnaya servisnaya kompaniya. Simultaneously, funds were transferred via the accounts of PBG-Ukraine and Stroy Holding to the actual company conducting the work. A portion of the funds remained there.

 

2. The end beneficiary of PBG-Ukraine is Polish entrepreneur Jerzy Wiśniewski. Income of the company from funder transfers amounted to about $3 million.

 

3. Turnover of all companies used in the described scheme was used in order to present information about the high turnover of the business in Ukraine to stock exchange investors.

 

4. Confirmed documented expenses for construction of the complex amount to $9.7 million from funds of the Polish investors. At the same time Energopol-Ukraine’s Director Tetiana Semenkova cannot explain what happened to another $20 million, despite numerous requests over many years from company shareholders.

 

5. Energopol-Ukraine was audited by Olga Audit, a firm not trusted by all its shareholders. It received excessive payment for its work.

 

6. As a result of underfinancing and waste of money, Energopol-Ukraine was forced to apply for credit support from Ukrainian banks, which made loans at high (25%-35%) interest rates. As a result, Ukrainian shareholders were deceived. They had earlier received promises by Polish investors that low-interest rate loans (2%-3%) would be obtained for construction work.

1. Composition of Energopol-Ukraine’s Supervisory Board in 2011:

Robert Bialchuk — Head of Supervisory Board

Silvia Kyzhevskaya

Vladyslav Sakun

Dariusz Szymański

Serhiy Pereverzev — auditor

 

2. Net profit of Energopol-Ukraine at the end of 2011, according to data from Ukraine’s National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC), amounted to UAH 9.13 million, compared to UAH 5.82 million in losses in 2010. Net revenues increased 39.7 times to UAH 49.1 million.

2012-2013

When a company conducts its affairs poorly the situation eventually becomes untenable. This happened in Ukraine. Dariusz Szymański and Jerzy Wiśniewski did not conduct their affairs carefully. As a result, in June 2012, Poland’s PBG S.A. went bankrupt.

Lengthy negotiations started between Jerzy Wiśniewski and his creditors.

Talks ended with Wiśniewski retaining his position as manager of the company. Control was given to bank representatives. Unfortunately, the revised state of affairs did not trigger an investigation of PBG S.A. in Ukraine. No one checked what happened to Energopol-Ukraine and its funds. PBG S.A. creditors should have immediately sorted out the situation with the company’s assets in Ukraine.

1. As a result of PBG S.A.’s bankruptcy and lengthy talks with creditors, Jerzy Wiśniewski remained manager of the company, but control over it was transferred to bank representatives.

 

2. The new situation did not trigger an investigation of PBG S.A.’s affairs in Ukraine. There was no check of what was happening with Energopol-Ukraine and its assets.

 

3. The task of putting into order projects carried out by PBG S.A. in Ukraine was the responsibility PBG S.A.’s board of creditors. An independent audit, provided for according management standards, would have sufficed, but this step was not taken.

 

4. After PBG S.A. was declared bankrupt in 2012, representatives of Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski S. A., Pekao S.A. Bank Polska, Opieki S.A. and Bank BGZ BNP Paribas S.A. were named to its Supervisory Board.

 

5. Management problems at Energopol-Ukraine created a situation that  required Ukraine’s government to provide financial assistance to complete the company’s Ministersky residential complex project. Although the funding enabled the company to finish construction, this only delayed the onset of more serious, systemic problems in the future.

1. Composition of Energopol-Ukraine’s Supervisory Board in 2012-2013:

Jerzy Wiśniewski — Head of Supervisory Board (Head of PBG S.A. Board)

Dariusz Szymański — (Wschodni Invest)

Vladyslav Sakun — private entrepreneur

Serhiy Pereverzev — (Olga Audit)

 

2. Share distribution of Energopol-Ukraine on 05.11.2012:

Wschodni Invest — 51%

Dariusz Szymański — 18%

Oleksandr Klymenko — 23%

Dialog Plus — 1%

 

3. Ownership structure of PBG S.A. after creditors enter company management:

Jerzy Wiśniewski — 23.61%

Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Polski SA — 6,48%

Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA — 7,68%

Bank BGŻ BNP Paribas SA — 6,1%

Other — 56.13%

Dariusz Szymański

Qualifications

District chamber of legal consultants in Poznań, training legal advisors (2001)

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, law and management faculty (1995)

 

Professional experience

Kancelaria Radców Prawnych Maciej Bednarkiewicz, Andrzej Wilczyński i Wspólnicy Spółka Komandytowa, with legal address in Warsaw (from 2006 to present) partner, legal consultant.

Skoczyński Wachowiak Strykowski, Kancelaria Prawna Spółka Komandytowa with legal address in Poznań (2009 — 2012) — Partner, legal consultant.

Kancelaria Radcy Prawnego Dariusz Szymański with legal address in Poznań  (from 2001 to present) — Legal consultant.

Kancelaria Prawna Piszcz i Wspólnicy Spółka Komandytowa with legal address in Poznań (2001 — 2006) — Legal consultant, managing partner

Commercial activities  (1991 — 1999) — Trading company owner.

RAFAKO S.A. Supervisory Board Member — since June 2015.

 

Responsibilities:

Legal aspects of company’s activities, information requirements, investments

1. Faced with a complicated situation, Energopol-Ukraine laid off employees and cut non-essential expenses. However, no meeting of shareholders was called, no audit was conducted and there was no payout of dividends. Company funds continued to be spent in a non-transparent manner.

 

2. Economic recession, which freed up a lot of working hours, did not lead Energopol-Ukraine’s company management to put its house and make legal its relations with shareholders. Meetings with shareholders were not held. Information about the company’s financial status was not shared.

 

3. Minority shareholders learned about existing problems in the company indirectly. They included failure to meet construction deadlines, clients expressing dissatisfaction publicly and employee layoffs.

 

4. In Poland, meanwhile, PBG S.A. shareholders and economic analysts had no idea of what was going on in Ukraine. Proof of this was an upbeat op-ed authored by Jerzy Wiśniewski appearing in leading publications.  Wiśniewski described the situation in a favorable light, presenting himself as a great builder and PBG S.A.’s savior.

1. Composition of Supervisory Board of Energopol-Ukraine in 2014-2016:

Jerzy Wiśniewski — Head of Supervisory Board (Head of PBG S.A. Board)

Dariusz Szymański — (Wschodni Invest, from 2015 — PBG S.A. Board member)

Vladyslav Sakun — private entrepreneur

Serhiy Pereverzev — (Olga Audit)

 

2. Composition of Energopol-Ukaine Supervisory Board in 2017:

Jerzy Wiśniewski — Head of Supervisory Board (Head of PBG S.A. Board)

Dariusz Szymański — (PBG S.A. Board member)

Vladyslav Sakun — private entrepreneur

Krytstina Yarzhemskaya — auditor

 

3. Distribution of Energopol-Ukraine shares on 19.03.2014:

Wschodni Invest — 49%

Dariusz Szymański — 20%

Oleksandr Klymenko — 23%

Tetiana Kostyleva — 7%

Dialog Plus — 1%

2014-2017

There was a change in power in Ukraine during 2014-2015 after a revolution and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Active warfare on the country’s borders and the loss of Ukrainian territory impacted the economy and led to a slump in the real estate market.

However, starting in 2015, real estate sales in Kyiv and Ukraine recovered. Government reforms and greater economic freedoms accelerated economic recovery and increased asset values. Meanwhile, in March 2014, PBG S.A. diverting attention of lenders and the public with litigations in Poland, erodes control of Energopol-Ukraine by PBG, taking away 2% of its 51% ownership stake. The move is actually the withdrawal of assets from lenders to PBG and PBG shareholders.

2018

Documents about the situation in Energopol-Ukraine were obtained by the company’s minority shareholders. Company managers were not able to hide all its operations. There was great interest in what was happening in the company because for many years there had been no meetings of shareholders or payout of dividends.

1. On December 13, 2018, a letter was sent to the the director of Energopol-Ukraine addressing several issues. During the drafting of the letter, the role of Dariusz Szymański, Jerzy Wiśniewski’s authorized representative, became known.

 

2. Minority shareholders brought up the years-long problem of Dariusz Szymański’s influence on payments and management of Energopol-Ukraine’s accounts.

 

3. Shareholders expressed concern that many Energopol-Ukraine employees for a long time reported directly to Dariusz Szymański.

 

4. The letter expressed unease with the fact that there was no information about 92% shares of Energopol-Ukraine in Ukraine’s requisite state registry. This was initially linked to the annulment of the license of registrar Global Capital. It was possible to settle this issue and find another registrar in order to put in order the company’s shareholder rights. This work was not done, however.

Composition of Energopol-Ukaine Supervisory Board in 2018:

Jerzy Wiśniewski — Head of Supervisory Board (Head of PBG S.A. Board)

Dariusz Szymański — (PBG S.A. Board member)

Vladyslav Sakun — private entrepreneur

2019
Starting in 2019, problems at Energopol-Ukraine had become blatantly obvious and well known throughout Kyiv’s construction market. Attempts were made to illegally use the Ministerial housing complex brand, an apartment sales system was undermined and indicators fell. In addition, the system of spending UAH 2 billion revenue received over several years remained unclear and unaccounted for.
During this time, Energopol-Ukraine shareholder and PBG Vice President Dariusz Szymański assured residents of the complex and investors that he would solve problems which had befallen project. .
Szymański, who headed Energopol-Ukraine's Supervisory Board, saw and knew about the company's situation situation in the company since the time when PBG first invested in Ukraine's market,
Namely Szymański for years concealed the real data on the state of affairs in Energopol-Ukraine from shareholders and creditors of the Polish PBG S.A. He had usurped managerial and financial power in the company since 2016.

1. In an attempt to avoid a scandal that could harm shared interests, the company’s minority shareholders in early 2019 wrote a letter to members of PBG S.A.’s Supervisory Board. The appeal articulated the essence of the company’s problems, namely, uncontrolled company expenditures. There was no response from the respected representatives of banks on the Supervisory Board.

 

2. The situation continued to deteriorate. By the spring of 2019, it took great efforts to dissuade investors from filing collective lawsuits against the company. No adequate reaction from either Energopol-Ukraine or Poland’s PBG S.A.was forthcoming.

3. on August 17, 2009, with the aim of controlling investment funds, subsequently used by official representatives and Energopol-Ukraine majority shareholders, a deliberately fictitious contract,  No.1/DR “For providing working documentation,” was concluded with Stroy Holding. There was no reason to order documentation at the time because the previous stage of “Project” did not exist. There were no grounds for entering the ‘working documentation’ stage. Stroy Holding, in addition, lacked the required licenses, permits and resources for production of working documentation in line with Ukrainian construction requirements (DBN, SNiP, DSTU).

 

For the actual implementation of design work, Energopol-Ukraine entered into an agreement with Construction and Investment Service Company, paying about UAH 24 million (about $3 million) for work from 2010 to 2018.  As a result of the fictitious contract, No.1 DR on August 17, 2009,  UAH 45,150,000 were withdrawn from Energopol-Ukraine’s accounts.

 

Energopol-Ukraine executives on August 20, 2009 entered into a fictitious contract (No.10/08) with Stroy Holding (the client), represented by its director B. Bolharyn. Energopol-Ukraine (the performer) was represented by director P. Matusiak (a Polish citizen).

 

The contract provided for the performer to provide services for the development of a business plan and to search for a potential investor for the housing complex project on Kondratiuk Street. There was no need to develop a business plan in order to find an investor. The company’s Polish investment funds were used to pay for services. The cost of work was overpriced more than 1,000-fold. Only as a result of concluding fictitious contracts between Energopol-Ukraine and Stroy Holding, the performer unreasonably transferred, and the client unreasonably received, funds in the total amount of UAH 80,050,000. That is equivalent to $10 million.

In 2009-2010, a fictitious contract was concluded between Cwertnia and Energopol-Ukraine for construction work in Poland. Because the Kyiv-based developer did not start the work in Poland, it was fined $670,000, funds which Polish citizens  Dariusz Szymański and Jerzy Wisniewski, along Energopol-Ukraine executives, received.

 

From 2009 to 2010, UAH 31,475,475 ($3.9 million) was transferred from the accounts of Energopol-Ukraine to the accounts of Dariusz Szymański. A portion of this amount was used for the construction of his personal vacation home (6,000 square meters) located on the shores of the Sea of Azov in Kyrylivka, Zaporozhia region.

PBG-Ukraine and Stroy Holding were used to siphon off funds from Energopol-Ukraine. Neither firm carried out any construction work, which was carried out by Construction and Investment Service Company.

 

PBG-Ukraine, whose end beneficiary is Jerzy Wiśniewski, received about $3 million from Energopol-Ukraine for the construction of the Ministersky residential complex on Kondratiuk Street in Kyiv. These transactions were used, in part, to inflate the turnover amounts of PGB S.A., a company traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.

 

Many people have suffered from the misappropriation of Energopol-Ukraine funds. They include investors and PGB S.A.’s creditors, who today spend their money to cover the frauds. Minority shareholders, who for years have not received dividends, have also suffered losses. Ukraine’s state budget also took a hit, because it did not receive significant amounts of tax revenue. Those who purchased flats in the fourth building of the residential complex — more than 200 families — have also been victimized.

4. Publicity about the scandal has damaged the reputation of Energopol-Ukraine as a construction developer.

 

5. In mid-April 2019, Dariusz Szymański attempted to resolve the numerous conflicts which had arisen with residents and investors of Energopol-Ukraine buildings. He presented a new service company, which he said would address shortcomings and problems. His presentation of the company ended with a scandal.

 

Szymańsky Letter

 

"Fake management" outrage" news

 

"Ministersky"-related news

 

 

 

 

 

 

6. In April 2019, in an illegal decision by Energopol-Ukraine’s Supervisory Board, a protocol for which does not exist, Tetiana Semenkova concluded a fictitious mortgage agreement for all property belonging to Energopol-Ukraine. The fictitious mortgage agreement is in favor of one of the companies to which Energopol-Ukraine owed money under a fictitious agreement.

 

As a result, more than 200 families suffered. The most cynical aspect of the arrangement is the fact that the fictitious contract from 2008 was used as the basis for transferring its and all property belonging to Energopol-Ukraine to Poland’s Hydrobudova S.A., a company controlled by PBG S.A. — the company that purportedly prepared the working documentation and business plan for the residential complex on Kondratiuk St. in Kyiv.

1. Distribution of Energopol-Ukraine assets after changes, on 19.03.2014:

Wschodni Invest – 49%

Dariusz Szymański – 20%

Oleksandr Klymenko – 23%

Tetiana Kostylyova – 7%

Dialog Plus – 1%

 

2. Supervisory Board of Ukraine-Energopol in 2018:

Jerzy Wiśniewski –Energopol-Ukraine Supervisory Board Head (PGB S.A. Board Head)

Dariusz Szymański – Energopol-Ukraine Supervisory Board member (PGB S.A. Board member)

Vladyslav Sakun – Energopol-Ukraine Supervisory Board member (private entrepreneur)

CLICK TO ENLARGE

1.  This graphic shows not only the events around the money and assets of PBG and its subsidiary Energopol-Ukraine. It also shows which people. How and through which entities influenced the situation and carried out certain operations.
 
2. The same graphic illustrates the tools used by accomplices to disguise what happened and divert public attention in Poland from what was occurring in Kyiv and will happen in the near future.
3. The investigation into the events involving Energopol-Ukraine, which began in the spring of 2019, has so far not yielded any visible results. However, there is every reason to expect Ukraine's police will compel defendants in the case to act actively, that is, to publicly deny and refute their participation in the case or lay the blame only on their accomplices. This will be a good result, because people will receive more information about what has happened and how.

CLICK TO ENLARGE

Shooting of four policemen near Kyiv with participation of Roman Marynovsky
 
"Exceeding the rights and full powers granted to them, acting deliberately, illegally and unreasonably while under arms leading to the death of four officers of National Police of Ukraine" — These are the conclusions of Ukrainian prosecutors to the events of December 4, 2016 near Kyiv. Roman Marynovsky is a suspect in the crime.
It was on this day that a group of police officers shot dead a group of their colleagues who were responding to an alarm triggered at a house outside Kyiv.
 
Roman Marynovsky at the time of the murder was Police Criminal Department Deputy Chief of Kyiv's Shevchenkivsky district's National. Four more suspects have been named in the case.
Two crimes have a lot in common
The execution of five policemen in outside Kyiv and embezzling assets from PBG's Energopol-Ukraine have something sinister in common.
 
In 2016, Special Weapons and Tactics police (KORD) of Ukraine's National Police in Knyazhychi, Brovarsky district fired automatic weapons against the staff of Brovarsky Police Department and two officers of the Main Department of operational service of the National Police in Kyiv.  Five law-enforcement officers were killed. The Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) investigation of the shootout has been delayed. Suspects in the killing were subsequently hired by Energopol-Ukraine to protect the Kyiv developer from 200 families who have been waiting for years for their apartments in a residential complex.
 
The Knyazhychi killings in December 2016 have been written about in numerous investigative reports. The story is muddled: police were waiting to ambush thieves robbing a rich house near Kyiv. One house was robbed, but there was no call for help. State Protection Service officers arrived after receiving an alarm signal. A deadly shootout ensued following hours of negotiations between Interior Ministry chiefs about who were the law-enforcers and who were the thieves.

CLICK TO ENLARGE

The negotiations resulted in the dispatch of the KORD unit was dispatched to the scene. They executed the State Protection Service guards, who had arrived two hours earlier.
 
The PGO is still investigating why, but the probe is progressing very slowly. Meanwhile, some members of the 'firing squad' have walked Scot-free. They include Roman Marynovsky, who quit the police force to work for Energopol-Ukraine's security service. Charges against a second law-enforcer, Leonid Kuriata, were dropped and he was reinstated.
 
Meanwhile, Andriy Kryshchenko, the person with whom Kuriata coordinated his actions, continues to work as a police chief in Kyiv.
 
Marynovsky was picked to head Energopol-Ukraine's security service after 2016 at a very interesting time - just as Energopol-Ukraine's Dariusz Szymanski (then Vice-President of the Polish construction giant PBG S.A.) was orchestrating the sale of Energopol-Ukraine's assets.
 
PBG S.A. in the spring of 2019 officially announced its intentions to sell off its Ukrainian subsidiary. Was the promise the result of Szymansk's actions? Of course it was. While 200 families who had paid for  apartments were waiting for housing, and residents of already completed houses were waiting for parking and landscaping, Dariusz Szymanski prepared all the company's assets for sale in order to pay off PBG's debts in Poland. He was assisted by Energpol-Ukraine Deputy Director Denys Stepanov, a lawyer who actively supervises the work with the courts and operations to withdraw funds from the company.
 
Szymanski's plan almost succeeded, thanks to a former Interior Ministry officer hired as Energopol-Ukraine's security chief. Ukrainian police, even retired ones, wield considerable influence.
 
During the spring and summer of 2019, all Energopol-Ukraine's assets were put on a third-party basis under a mortgage agreement. This became possible because someone convincingly influenced both the notary public and the company’s managers. Since it took a number of laws to violate the operation, all of the company's assets were nearly lost to all investors and Ukrainian shareholders of Energopol-Ukraine.
 
Police have been reluctant to investigate the case.  The criminal investigation of embezzlement of funds from Energopol-Ukraine, launched in April 2019, initially yielded impressive results - the company's assets were seized, which made it impossible to steal them before the end of the proceedings. There was talk that Energopol-Ukraine's Security Chief Marynovsky was working his connections with Kyiv Police Chief Kryschenko.
The police investigation into the thefts in the Kyiv developer began to slow down. There were rumors about the transfer of the case, its possible closure and the circle of suspects changed.
 
The slowdown undermines faith that a fair investigation will be conducted. Court rulings on cases involving Enegopol-Ukraine and its contractors have been outrageous in recent months and have nothing in common sense or rule of law. Without powerful pressure from law-enforcement agencies, these verdicts would not be possible.
 
With the advent of high police ranks in the case of Energopol-Ukraine, the forecasts of observers have also changed. There are fears that the resonant robbery of apartment investors and construction companies will be tried to be released on the brakes in the same way as the shooting of five policemen. Moreover, the same people can do this.